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Firm Characteristics, Economic Conditions and 
Capital Structure Adjustments* 
Wolfgang Drobetza, Pascal Pensab and Gabrielle Wanzenriedc 
This is version: 5 January 2007 
Abstract 
We use a dynamic framework and panel methodology to investigate the 
determinants of a firms’ time-varying capital structure. Our sample com-
prises 706 European firms from France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. over 
the period from 1983 to 2002. If capital structure adjustment is costly, firms 
may deviate temporarily from their target debt ratios. Therefore, we en-
dogenize the adjustment process and analyze the impact of firm-specific 
characteristics as well as macroeconomic factors on the speed of adjustment 
towards target leverage. We find that larger and faster growing firms as well 
as firms that are further away from their targets adjust more readily. Addi-
tionally, we document interesting relations between well-known business 
cycle variables and the adjustment speed. In a nutshell, firms adjust faster in 
favorable macroeconomic conditions, e.g., if interest rates are low and the 
risk of disruptions in the global financial system are negligible. We also 
document that capital structure decision are largely determined by financial 
constraints. Finally, we shed new light on the interdependence between 
book value based and market value based measures of leverage as well as on 
capital structure rebalancing issues. 
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1. Introduction 
For almost 50 years now, theoretic as well as empirical research seeks to identify determi-
nants of corporate capital structure decisions. While Miller and Modigliani (1958) derive 
conditions under which the capital structure choice is irrelevant to firm valuation, the subse-
quent theoretical literature has shown that a firm can influence its value and improve its future 
prospects by varying its ratio between debt and equity.1 While renowned theories of capital 
structure explain differences in the optimal debt-to-equity ratio across firms, most of the em-
pirical literature uses actual or observed debt ratios as a proxy for a firm’s optimal leverage. 
For example, Titman and Wessels (1988) for U.S. data and Rajan and Zingales (1995) for an 
international sample document that leverage is related to firm-specific characteristics such as 
profitability, investment opportunities, tangibility of assets or earnings volatility.2 However, 
as forcefully argued by Heshmati (2001), traditional capital structure theories do not explain 
observed differences in leverage ratios, but rather differences in optimal leverage ratios across 
firms. Using observed debt ratios is therefore particularly problematic if adjustments to the 
optimal leverage are costly. In the presence of adjustment costs, it may be cheaper for firms 
not to fully adjust to the target even if they recognize that their existing leverage ratios are not 
optimal. 
However, traditional capital structure models cannot capture dynamic capital structure ad-
justments. Furthermore, recent survey evidence by Graham and Harvey (2001), Brounen, de 
Joung and Kloedijk (2004) and Drobetz, Pensa and Wöhle (2006) strongly suggests that firm 
decision makers seek a target debt-to-equity ratio. Their main objective in setting debt policy 
is not to minimize a firm’s weighted average cost of capital, but rather to preserve financial 
flexibility, which is best explained in the context of a pecking order theory of capital struc-
ture. Nevertheless, due to random events or other changes, firms may temporarily deviate 
from the target or optimal leverage and only gradually work back to the optimum. To account 
for these stylized facts, several researchers have adopted a more dynamic approach, where the 
observed and target leverage may differ due to the presence of adjustment costs. For example, 
Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) study the difference between a firm’s maximum and 
minimum leverage ratios over time and identify characteristics of firms with larger swings in 
their capital structures. They use the observed debt ratio range of a firm as an empirical meas-
                                                
1 See Andrés Alonso, Lopéz Iturriaga and Rodrìguez Sanz (2005) for more recent evidence. 
2 See also Bhaduri (2002) and Panno (2003). 
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ure of the capital structure. Their results are consistent with the capital structure choice in the 
presence of adjustment costs in a dynamic setting.3 In an even earlier paper, Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984) document that a firm’s financial behavior is characterized by partial adjustment 
to long-run financial targets. In their setup, the speed of adjustment is affected by firm charac-
teristics and therefore varies across companies and over time. However, the long-run financial 
targets towards firms partially adjust are specified exogenously. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) and Fama and French (2002) also use the historical mean debt ratio for each firm over 
the sample period as a proxy for the target debt ratio. Most recently, Wanzenried (2006) do-
cuments that capital structure adjustment behavior is also highly dependent on the institutio-
nal setting. In a dynamic setup, she finds that the development of the financial market, the 
efficiency of the legal system and better shareholder protection have positive effects on the 
adjustment speed towards endogenously specified target capital structures. 
Using Spanish data, De Miguel and Pindado (2001) present a novel methodology to cap-
ture capital structure dynamics more appropriately. They develop a target adjustment model 
to explain a firm’s leverage in terms of its leverage ratio in the previous period and its target 
leverage ratio, the latter being a function of well-known firm characteristics, such as profit-
ability, growth and tangibility of assets. Their setup endogenizes the target leverage ratio, 
which allows to identify the determinants of the optimal or target capital structure rather than 
using the observed ratios. They specify a dynamic adjustment model with predetermined vari-
ables and apply the dynamic panel suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). It is crucial to 
note that De Miguel and Pindado (2001) still estimate a time- and firm-constant adjustment 
coefficient. Their empirical results reveal that Spanish firms face lower adjustment costs than 
U.S. firms.4 
While these papers constitute important steps towards more realistic tests of capital struc-
ture theories, they still remain silent on which factors determine the adjustment process to-
wards target leverage. Banjeree, Heshmati and Whilborg (2004) were the first to simultane-
ously endogenize both the adjustment factor and the target leverage ratio. In addition to iden-
tifying the determinants of the target capital structure, their setup allows to estimate the speed 
of adjustment towards the target capital structure and to identify the determinants of the speed 
                                                
3 Consistent with Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory of the capital structure, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman 
(2001) document that profitability is a predictor of observed leverage ratios in the short run. Nevertheless, firms 
make financing and repurchase decisions that offset earnings-driven changes in their capital structure. This sup-
ports the static trade-off theory of the capital structure and the existence of a target leverage ratios. However, the 
latter may not be a primary goal of firm’s decision makers (see Panno, 2003; Leary and Roberts, 2005). 
4 Flannery and Rangan (2006) provide recent U.S. evidence for firm- and time-constant adjustment estimates. 
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of adjustment simultaneously. Using U.S. and U.K. data, they hypothesize that the speed of 
adjustment is dependent on the absolute difference between the current and the target leverage 
ratio, the firm’s growth opportunities and its size. However, they do not find a significant 
relationship between the likelihood of adjustment and the absolute difference between target 
leverage in time t and observed leverage in t-1.5 In a related paper, Lööf (2004) compares the 
dynamics of capital structure adjustments across the two archetypes of financial systems, the 
U.S. and the U.K.’s mostly market-based and the Swedish mostly bank-based system. His 
results reveal that although firms are frequently not at their target debt level, the deviation is 
smaller for the highly equity-dependent U.S. and U.K. firms. In addition, these firms adjust 
faster towards the target capital structure compared to the more debt-dependent Swedish 
companies. Using similar variables to capture the speed of adjustment as Banjeree, Heshmati 
and Whilborg (2004), he finds that the estimate for the distance variable is significantly nega-
tive for U.K. firms, indicating that it is less costly to adjust by relatively small amounts.6 
Economic intuition suggests that the position of the economy in the business cycle phase is 
an important determinant of default risk and, hence, of financing decisions. It is therefore an 
interesting research question to analyze the impact of macroeconomic factors on the speed of 
adjustment to the target capital structure. Lacking well-defined empirical predictions, previ-
ous studies included e set of time dummies to capture these time-specific effects. Recently, 
Hackbarth, Miao and Morrelec (2006) developed a contingent claims model in which firm’s 
cash flows depend on both an idiosyncratic shock and an aggregate shock that reflects the 
state of the economy (e.g., booms and recessions). Their model delivers state-dependent 
shareholders’ default policies, which in turn have interesting implications for optimal lever-
age. First, the model predicts that leverage is counter-cyclical. Second, macroeconomic condi-
tions determine both the pace and the size of capital structure changes. Allowing a firm to 
adjust its capital structure dynamically, the restructuring threshold is lower in good states than 
in bad states. Therefore, firms should adjust their capital structure more often and by smaller 
amounts in booms than in recessions. The empirical results in Korajczyk and Levy (2003) 
support some of these predictions. Looking at a 50 years history of the U.S. aggregate non-
financial corporate debt to asset ratio, they show that target leverage is counter-cyclical, i.e., 
there is a negative relation between macroeconomic variables and leverage. Note that this is 
consistent with a pecking order theory of capital structure, but inconsistent with a trade-off 
                                                
5 See Heshmati (2001) for similar results using a sample of Swedish micro and small firms. 
6 In a comparable setup, Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) find evidence for a panel of 90 Swiss firms. 
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theory. In a theoretical model, Levy (2001) argues that levered managers’ wealth is reduced 
relative to outside shareholders in recessions, which exacerbates the agency problem. In order 
to realign manager’s incentives with those of shareholders, the optimal amount of debt in-
creases, implying counter-cyclical debt ratios for firms that are not financially constrained. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) further document that macroeconomic conditions are important 
for the issue choice. Firms tend to time their issues to periods of favorable macroeconomic 
conditions, i.e., periods of higher relative security prices. Most important, firms issue equity 
when the stock market experienced large run-ups and when economic prospects are good, as 
indicated by popular business cycle variables (e.g., interest rates, term spread or credit 
spread).7 However, the findings are not uniform across their sample. Financially constrained 
firms exhibit a pro-cyclical target leverage ratio and their issue choice is less sensitive to 
variations in macroeconomic conditions than unconstrained firms. Intuitively, financially con-
strained firms should not be able to time their security issues. 
We investigate the adjustment process to target capital structure using a sample of 706 
firms from Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom over the period from 1982 to 
2002. We start by identifying the determinants of the capital structure. We then analyze the 
effects of well-known firm characteristics as well as macroeconomic factors on the speed of 
adjustment towards endogenously specified target debt ratios. We document that large firms, 
faster growing firms and firms that are further away from target leverage adjust more readily. 
Our results further reveal interesting relations between the speed of adjustment and well-
known business cycle variables. We find that the speed of adjustment is faster when economic 
prospects are good. Additionally, we shed new light on market timing and capital structure 
rebalancing arguments. Our results reveal a clear tendency that firms are reluctant to adjust 
their capital structure following periods of higher relative valuations and that large variation 
in market leverage ratios leads to faster adjustment in book leverage ratios in the following 
period. Finally, we document that financial constraints clearly determine capital structure de-
cisions. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 starts by developing a dynamic capital 
structure framework and briefly introducing familiar determinants of the target capital struc-
ture. We proceed with a discussion of firm-specific and macroeconomic determinants of the 
                                                
7 Baker and Wurgler (2002) also document that firms tend to raise equity when market valuations are relatively 
high compared to book and past market values. The resulting effects on capital structure are persistent, suggest-
ing that the current capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past market bets. 
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speed of adjustment towards target leverage. Section 3 describes the panel of our international 
company data. Section 4 contains the empirical results and section 5 concludes this paper. 
2. A dynamic capital structure framework 
In this section, we discuss the framework for our dynamic capital structure model. While 
section 2.1 presents the model and the estimation method, section 2.2 briefly introduces the 
determinants of target capital structure. We introduce the variables that influence the speed of 
adjustment to target debt ratios in section 2.3. 
2.1 Model 
Following previous work in this field (e.g., Heshmati, 2001, DeMiguel and Pindado, 2001, 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001, Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006), we consider a dy-
namic capital structure model. Let the optimal or target debt-to-equity ratio (leverage ratio) of 
firm 
! 
i  in period 
! 
t , 
! 
LV
it
*, be a linear function of a set of 
! 
L  explanatory variables, 
! 
X jit  (where 
! 
j =1,2,...,L ), that have been used in past cross-sectional studies of capital structure: 
(1) 
! 
LVit
*
= " j X jit
j=1
L
# . 
It is important to note that this dynamic setup implies that target leverage ratios vary across 
both firms and over time. The purpose of equation (1) is to provide an estimate of each firm’s 
target leverage ratio. Following Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) and De Miguel and 
Pindado (2001), we define target leverage ratio as the extent of leverage, a firm would choose 
in the absence of information asymmetries, transaction costs and other adjustment costs. 
Without frictions, the observed leverage ratio of firm 
! 
i  at time 
! 
t , 
! 
LV
it
, should be equal to its 
target leverage ratio, i.e. 
! 
LV
it
= LV
it
*. If, however, adjustment to target leverage is costly, firms 
may not fully adjust their actual leverage ratios to their target from one period to the other. 
Partial adjustment is usually formalized as follows: 
(2) 
! 
LV
it
" LV
it"1( ) = #it LVit
*
" LV
it"1( ) , 
where 
! 
"
it
 captures the speed of adjustment to the target leverage ratio, starting from previ-
ous year’s leverage, 
! 
LV
it"1
. Note that in contrast to De Miguel and Pindado (2001), this ad-
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justment is not firm and time-constant. In the presence of adjustment costs, we expect that 
! 
"
it
<1, hence, a firm does not fully adjust its deviations from period 
! 
t "1 to period 
! 
t . This 
hypothesis is consistent with the stability condition that 
! 
"
it
<1, which implies that 
! 
LV
it
" LV
it
* as 
! 
t"# . Note that if 
! 
"
it
=1, all deviations from target or optimal leverage are 
corrected instantaneously and a firm’s leverage is always at the target. If, however, 
! 
"
it
>1, a 
firm adjusts more than would be necessary and does not meet its target leverage ratio.8 
In other models of leverage ratio adjustments, the optimal target ratio is externally deter-
mined either in terms of historical data or by an adjustment process with lags of more than 
one year (e.g., Jalilvand and Harris, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Our model fol-
lows De Miguel and Pindado (2001) and Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), where firms 
adjust to a target ratio that is not determined externally as in previous studies. Instead, the 
target leverage ratio is included in the model as a linear function of the determining factors of 
capital structure, as specified in equation (1). Our contribution is that we extend this class of 
models and further endogenize the speed of adjustment to the target debt ratio. To explain the 
adjustment speed, we assume that 
! 
"
it
 varies over time and is itself a linear function of a con-
stant term and some predetermined explanatory variables. A determinant of adjustment speed, 
! 
Z
it
, is either a firm-specific or a macroeconomic variable (see section 2.3). Specifically, we 
have: 
(3) 
! 
"
it
= #
0
+ #
1
Z
it
. 
To keep the estimation problem tractable and to avoid multicollinearity problems with 
macroeconomic variables, we apply the different determinants of adjustment speed separately 
one at a time in our main analysis but include the combined determinants in our robustness 
checks to address a potential omitted variables bias.9 Therefore, 
! 
Z
it
 is a scalar if only one 
adjustment speed determinant is considered and a vector if multiple determinants are in-
cluded. When firm-specific variables are used to explain the speed of adjustment, 
! 
Z
it
 has both 
a time-series and a cross-sectional interpretation. In the case of macroeconomic variables, 
! 
Z
it
 
is not firm-specific and hence does not have a cross-sectional interpretation. Followingly, we 
can drop the subscript 
! 
it  in favor of only 
! 
t . 
                                                
8 Lööf (2004) argues that overadjustment may reflect unanticipated changes in economic conditions. 
9 See table 3 for a correlation analysis of our variables. 
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Rewriting the target adjustment model in equation (2), treating target leverage, 
! 
LV
it
*, as 
linearly dependent from the capital structure determinants as specified in equation (1), and 
substituting the linear specification for the adjustment speed, 
! 
"
it
, from equation (3), yields the 
following expression for the leverage ratio of firm 
! 
i  in period 
! 
t : 
(4) 
! 
LV
it
 
! 
= 1"#
it( )LVit"1 + #LVit
* + u
it
 
  
! 
= 1"#
0
"#
1
Zit( )LVit"1 + #0 + #1( ) $ iX jit
j=1
L
%
& 
' 
( ( 
) 
* 
+ + + uit , 
where 
! 
u
it
 is a statistical error term with mean zero and constant variance (i.e., white noise 
disturbance). Multiplying equation (4) out and bearing in mind that all our estimations are 
carried out with panel data, we finally obtain equation (5), which is subject to our empirical 
investigation: 
(5) 
! 
LVit = 1"#0( )LVit"1 "#1ZitLVit"1 + #0 $ j X jit + #1 $ jZit X jit
j=1
L
% + dt +&i + uit
j=1
L
% , 
where 
! 
d
t
 is a time-specific effect, and 
! 
"
i
 is a firm-specific effect. Generally, it is assumed, 
that firm-specific effects are unobservable but have a significant impact on leverage. The ef-
fects differ across firms but are fixed for a given firm over time. In contrast, time-specific 
effects vary over time but are the identical for all firms in a given year, capturing mainly 
broader economic influences that are outside the firm’s control.10 When we estimate equation 
(5), we mainly focuse on 
! 
"
1
, which is the coefficient on the interaction term between the de-
terminant variable(s) of adjustment speed, 
! 
Z
it
, and the lagged leverage, 
! 
LV
it"1
. The null hy-
pothesis is that 
! 
"
1
= 0, i.e., the speed of adjustment is independent from firm-specific charac-
teristics and/or the business cycle. It is important to note, that this does not mean that firms do 
                                                
10 However, there is one caveat. In the estimations we find that the time-specific effects, dt, absorb most of the 
explanatory power of our macroeconomic determinants of the speed of adjustment. Therefore, when Zit denotes a 
macroeconomic variable (see section 2.3), we estimate equation (5) without time-specific effects and thus as-
sume that all time-specific affects are captured sufficiently well by our variables. 
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not adjust their leverage ratios at all over time; this would only be the case if 
! 
1"#
0( )  was 
estimated insignificantly as well.11 
2.1.1 Estimation method 
Using panel data, Banjeree, Heshmati and Wihlborg (2004) and Lööf (2004) apply a non-
linear least square methodology to estimate the parameters in a setup similar to ours in equa-
tion (5). However, their methodology leads to biased and inconsistent estimators because er-
ror terms tend to be correlated with lagged leverage, 
! 
LV
it"1
. Therefore, we estimate the dy-
namic leverage model by controlling for fixed-effects by applying a first-difference transfor-
mation. Even when the regressors are not correlated with the unobservable firm-specific ef-
fects, it is still necessary to control for them in a dynamic setup. This is because 
! 
LV
it"1
 will be 
correlated with 
! 
"
i
 that does not vary over time, and a first-difference transformation to elimi-
nate fixed effects introduces correlation between lagged dependent variables and the differ-
enced errors. Therefore, 
! 
"LV
it#1
 and 
! 
"u
it
 will be correlated through terms 
! 
LV
it"1
 and 
! 
u
it"1
, and 
an ordinary least squares methodology will not to consistent estimates.12 
Another estimation problem, which is not necessarily specific to the dynamic specification, 
arises because the firm-specific variables are unlikely to be strictly exogenous. Shocks that 
impact the a firm’s leverage are likely to impact some of the regressor variables such as firm 
profitability and firm size as well. Furthermore, some of the regressor variables may be corre-
lated with past und current values of idiosyncratic components of disturbances. 
The problems described above suggest the use of an instrumental variables (IV) estimation 
methodology, where the lagged dependent and endogenous regressors are instrumented. 
Therefore, we apply the dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). They prove that Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation provides consis-
tent parameter estimates by utilizing instruments that can be obtained from orthogonality 
conditions that exist between the lagged values of the variables and the disturbances. Specifi-
cally, we estimate equation (5) in first differences using GMM, where we use the levels of all 
                                                
11 Finally, it must be noted that Zit not only impacts the adjustment speed. As can easily be inferred from the 
second summation in equation (5), it also impacts the level of the time varying target leverage ratio. However, 
we are not interested in these dynamics and do not further comment on this issue. 
12 An alternative to first-difference transformation is the within transformation that is commonly used in the 
literature. Although this approach controls for the fixed effects, it introduces correlation between the lagged 
dependent variables and the lagged error term, leading to biased estimates. The magnitude of this bias falls with 
the number of observations (see Nickel, 1981). However, we have a maximum of 20 years of observations and, 
hence, the problem will not vanish. 
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right-hand side variables at the second lag as instruments.13 Using instrumental variables also 
accounts for the fact that delays may arise between the decision to change the capital structure 
and its actual implementation. Finally, it must be noted that Hovakimian, Opler and Titman 
(2001), among others, estimate the target leverage ratio in a first step and the speed of ad-
justment in a second step using fitted values from the first step. This imposes an errors-in-
variables problem. In contrast, our approach allows us to estimate the 
! 
"  and 
! 
"  coefficients in 
equation (5) simultaneously in one single step. 
As suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), we use their one-step GMM estimator for in-
ference on coefficients. All coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In addition, to 
make sure that target leverage is properly specified, we report a Wald test statistic for the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants of target leverage are jointly equal to zero. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) further show that the coefficient estimates are only consistent if 
there is no second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Therefore, we report a 
test-statistic (
! 
z
2
) for the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation in the residuals. 
Because this restriction is violated in most of our model specifications, we estimate equation 
(5) by including the second lag of leverage, 
! 
LV
it"2
, as an additional explanatory variable. Note 
that the inclusion of this additional variable accomplishes a mere statistical requirement 
(hence, to guarantee consistent parameter estimates). However, the impact of past leverage 
beyond the first lag is not the subject of our empirical investigation. Therefore, we do not 
provide further economic interpretation of this variable. Additionally, we do not model the 
second lag of leverage, 
! 
LV
it"2
, in the same way as we model the first lag, 
! 
LV
it"1
, and we omit 
reporting the corresponding estimates. 
Again following the recommendation by Arellano and Bond (1991), we adopt their two-
step GMM estimator for inference about model specification. With respect to the validity of 
the instruments, we conduct a Sargan (1958) test of the null hypothesis that the overidentify-
ing restrictions are valid. As already mentioned above, we use the second lag of all (endoge-
nous and exogenous) variables (in levels) as instruments, and a Sargan test indicates whether 
these instruments are independent from the residuals. 
To further assess the stability of our system (i.e., to guarantee convergence to a target), we 
check that the test statistic defined as the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent vari-
                                                
13 Using first differences removes possible firm-specific effects by avoiding any correlation between unobserv-
able firm-specific characteristics and regressor variables. See Verbeek (2004) for a textbook treatment. 
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able, 
! 
LV
it"1
, minus the estimate of 
! 
"
1
 times the mean of 
! 
Z
it
 falls into the interval 
! 
0,1[ ]. This 
requirement is fulfilled in all model specifications. 
2.2 Capital structure determinants 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991), the consensus is that “leverage increases with fixed 
assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, and firm size and decreases with vola-
tility, advertising expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy, profitability and uniqueness of 
the product.”14 Therefore, we selected the following five variables for our empirical investiga-
tion: tangibility of assets (TANG), firm size (SIZE), the growth opportunities (GROWTH), 
profitability (ROA) and non-debt tax shields (TAX). We use these determinant variables to 
provide an estimate of each firm’s target leverage ratio. Since this variables are all well 
known and common in empirical investigations of this manner, we omit a detailed discus-
sion.15 
2.3 Adjustment speed determinants 
2.3.1 Firm-specific factors 
We assume that the speed of adjustment towards the target capital structure, 
! 
"
it
, depends 
on three firm-specific factors. Two of these determinant variables also affect the target debt 
level (GROWTH and SIZE). The third variable measures the distance between the current 
and the target debt ratio (DIST). All three variables can be interpreted as trading off the costs 
of changing the capital structure against the costs associated with a suboptimal level of leve-
rage 
Distance between observed and target leverage (DIST): If fixed costs (e.g., legal and in-
vestment bank fees) constitute a major portion of the total cost of changing the capital structu-
re, firms with suboptimal leverage will change their capital structure if they are sufficiently 
far away from the target capital structure, i.e., the costs of maintaining the actual debt ratio 
are higher than the cost of changing the capital structure back towards the target. Accor-
dingly, we hypothesize that the likelihood of adjustment is a positive function of the absolute 
difference between target leverage and current leverage. We define the variable DISTit as 
(6) 
! 
DIST
it
= LV
it
*
" LV
it
, 
                                                
14 See Harris and Raviv (1991), p. 335. 
15 Drobetz, Pensa and Wanzenried (2006) contains a detailed discussion of these variables. 
 12 
where 
! 
LV
it
* is the fitted value from a fixed-effects regression of the debt ratio of the firm i 
on the capital structure determinants at time t. 
If the fixed costs of adjustment are prohibitively high, firms will avoid approaching the ca-
pital market and are restricted to use payout policy to adjust towards the target leverage. Intui-
tively, the costs of a suboptimal payout policy are increasing with the magnitude of the abso-
lute difference between the target leverage and the current leverage. In contrast to external 
adjustment, however, internal adjustment is limited by the possibilities of internal funding 
(e.g., share repurchases have to be paid) and the maximal amount to be paid out (e.g., all pro-
fits are paid out as dividends). The maximal adjustment step for internal adjustment is given 
by the sum of all internal funds, i.e., the sum of retained earnings, reserves and actual profit. 
In the presence of general investment plans, firms will refrain from using all internal funds for 
capital structure adjustments, and internal adjustment steps tend to be smaller. Hence, if firms 
adjust internally rather than externally through outside financing, dynamic capital structure 
adjustment is slower and there should be a negative relationship between DI S T and the 
speed of adjustment.  
Sorting out between the two hypotheses is an empirical matter. 
Growth opportunities (GROWTH): Growth firms generally have limited internal funds, 
because these firms are typically young and have zero or even negative operating income. 
Therefore, especially these firms are highly dependent on external financing possibilities 
(e.g., venture capital). Because growth firms regularly need to finance their investments ex-
ternally, it should be easier for these firms to change their capital structures by altering the 
composition of the outside funding according to their target capital structures. Even under 
asymmetric information, the firm value of growing firms may remain unchanged because of 
positive effects of future growth opportunities. In contrast, a non-growth firm can only change 
its capital structure by swapping debt against equity or vice versa. However, this may induce 
negative signaling effects in the presence of asymmetric information with a negative impact 
on firm value. Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive relationship between GROWTH and 
the adjustment speed. 
Firm size (SIZE): If changing the capital structure involves substantial fixed costs, these 
costs are relatively larger for small firms. Therefore, large firms should be able to correct de-
viations from the target capital structure at a relatively lower cost. In addition, due to better 
analyst coverage, more information is publicly available about large firms, implying better 
access to capital markets and lower anticipated costs arising from informational asymmetries 
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upon announcement of debt or equity issues (e.g., negative share price reactions). Hence, we 
hypothesize a positive relationship between SIZE and the speed of adjustment. 
2.3.2 Macroeconomic factors 
In addition to firm-specific factors introduced above, Banjeree, Heshmati and Whilborg 
(2004) and Lööf (2004) argue that economy-wide factors should impact the speed of adjust-
ment to target capital structures. They include time-specific effects to capture these impacts in 
a simplistic way. However, these time-specific effects are hard to interpret and therefore we 
apply a set of macroeconomic variables in our empirical analysis and measure their effect on 
adjustment speed. We examine the hypotheses proposed by Hackbarth, Miao and Morrelec 
(2005) that the speed of adjustment depends on the stage of the business cycle. They argue 
that the speed is higher in booms than in recessions. We use popular business cycle variables, 
i.e. variables that are assumed to be highly related to the current and/or future state of the 
economy, to model the time variation in the target-adjustment coefficient. The following fac-
tors are assumed to have an impact on the speed of adjustment: the short interest rate 
(ISHORT) and the term spread of interest rates (TERM), the credit spread (CREDIT), TED 
spread (TED) and finally the run-up average dividend yield (DY) and stock market perform-
ance (STOCKS). 
Short interest rate (ISHORT) and term spread (TERM): The slope of the term structure of 
interest rates (TERM) is generally assumed to be a predictor of future business cycle stages. It 
is widely acknowledged in the literature that a high (low) term spread can be interpreted as an 
indicator of good (bad) economic prospects (e.g. Harvey, 1991; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 
1991). Consumption smoothing drives the demand for insurance or hedging, and a natural 
way is to substitute bonds of different maturities. If the economy is in a growth stage, but a 
general slowdown is expected, investors will hedge by buying assets that deliver safe payoffs 
during the future economic downturn. For example, they could purchase long-term govern-
ment bonds and simultaneously sell short-term bonds for hedging purposes. If many investors 
follow this pattern, the price of long-term bonds increases, implying decreasing yields. In 
contrast, the selling pressure in short-term bonds will drive down prices and increase yields. 
As a result, the term structure flattens or even becomes inverted. Chen (1991) also documents 
that an above average term spread forecasts that the gross natural product will continue to 
increase over the next four to six quarters. Following the predictions in Hackbarth, Miao, and 
Morrelec (2005), we expect faster adjustment in booms than in recessions and therefore the 
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coefficient should be positive. In a similar vein, we hypothesize a negative relationship be-
tween ISHORT and adjustment speed. 
There is increasing empirical evidence that managers attempt to time both equity and debt 
issues. Most important, the results in Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that the observed 
capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past (equity) market bets. An upward sloping 
term structure combined with generally low interest rates are usually interpreted as preceding 
indicators of an economic expansion. High expected real growth implies rising stock market 
valuations and, according to the market timing hypothesis, more equity financing activities in 
attempt to exploit “windows of opportunity”.16 Henderson, Jegadeesh and Weisbach (2004) 
find similar evidence for debt issuances and report a negative relationship between the level 
of interest rates and the quantity of long- and short-term debt issued.17 Therefore, firms ap-
pear to time their debt issues for both long- and short-term bonds. These empirical results are 
supported by survey evidence by Graham and Harvey (2001) and Drobetz, Pensa and Wöhle 
(2006), where chief financial officers claim that they attempt to issue debt at times of low 
interest rates.18 Firms thus attempt to time market interest rates and issue short-term debt 
when they feel interest rates are particularly low relative to long-term interest rates. 
Henderson, Jegadeesh and Weisbach (2004) further document that debt issues increase when 
interest rates are low mainly because firms have larger capital demands, and the substitution 
effect of debt for equity is of secondary importance. This is a crucial observation in our con-
text, because we do not test predictions about the amount of leverage over the business cycle, 
but rather the speed of adjustment to the target leverage ratio. 
Finally, better prospects for real activity should lead to increasing cash flows from opera-
tions and higher profitability. Even if firms do not approach financing markets, increased op-
erational efficiency should enable them to adjust internally by altering their payout policy. 
The sum of these arguments strengthens our main hypothesis that there is a positive relation-
ship between the term structure of interest rates (TERM) and adjustment speed, and a nega-
tive relationship between the level of short-term interest rates (ISHORT) and the speed of 
convergence to target leverage. 
                                                
16 Dittmar and Tharok (2006) introduce a new framework that can explain this managerial behavior. 
17 See Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) for similar evidence. They document that firms borrow long when 
debt market conditions suggest that the relative cost of long-term debt is low. 
18 The evidence is not conclusive yet as to whether managers are in fact successful timers. Baker, Greenwood 
and Wurgler (2003) report that firms tend to borrow long when excess bond returns are predictably low. Long-
term debt issues predict lower excess bond returns, and short-term debt issues predict higher excess bond re-
turns. In contrast, Henderson, Jegadeesh and Weisbach (2004) only find weak evidence that the aggregate level 
of the quantity of new debt issued predicts future changes in interest rates. 
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In our empirical analysis, we use the 3-month money market interest rate as the short-term 
interest rate. The term spread is constructed as the difference between the yield on long-term 
government bonds with maturities of at least 10 years and the 3-month money market interest 
rate. 
Credit spread (CREDIT) and Treasury Bill - Eurodollar Spread (TED): The credit spread is 
calculated as the difference between the yield on AAA graded corporate bonds and govern-
ment bonds. We assume that this variable is a legitimate proxy for default risk in an economy. 
Similarly, the TED spread is defined as the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar rate 
and the 90-day yield on the U.S. Treasury bill. TED can be viewed as a “political” risk pre-
mium that reflects either actual or anticipated barriers to international investing (e.g., Ferson 
and Harvey, 1993). The yield differential widens when the risk of disruption in the global 
financial system increases. Thus, following the general notion in Hackbarth, Miao and Mor-
relec (2005) that the speed of adjustment is higher in good states than in bad states of the 
global economy, one would expect a negative relationship between the adjustment speed and 
the size of the credit spread (CREDIT) as well as TED spread (TED). However, Baker, 
Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) document that both the credit spread and the TED spread are 
unrelated to long-term debt as a fraction of total debt issues as well as future bond returns. 
Furthermore, Chen (1991) finds finds that CREDIT is a better indicator for past economic 
activity of up to 4 quarters. We therefore suspect that the relationships are weaker and more 
ambiguous compared to the relationship between the speed of adjustment and the term spread 
as well as the general level of interest rates. 
3. Data 
3.1 Sample 
The basic sample of our empirical investigation corresponds to Wanzenried (2006) and tar-
gets all firms present in the country-specific DATASTREAM Thomson Financial market 
indices (TOTMK) of France, Germany Italy and the United Kingdom. For each country, these 
indices include the top 85% of all listed firms by market capitalization. The selection of those 
four countries follows Rajan and Zingales (1995). The indeces include a total of 1’203 firms 
(548 United Kingdom, 248 each Germany and France and 159 Italy). However, due to miss-
ing observations for our main regression variables, the number of firms shrinks to 1’021 cor-
porations. Furthermore, we exclusively focus on non-financial firms. This restriction is neces-
sary because banks as well as investment and insurance companies are subject to specific 
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regulations concerning their capital structure and are additionally severely affected by exoge-
nous factors (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Therefore, we exclude an additional 109 com-
panies that are categorized as banks, insurance firms or investment companies according to 
the DATASTREAM index classification. Finally, we require that firms exhibit complete 
company accounts for all firm years in the respective observation period and a minimum 
number of 3 consecutive observation years. This restriction eliminates an additional 108 com-
panies. However, the firms with insufficient observations are slightly larger than the firms in 
the final sample. The sum of these restrictions leaves us with a final panel of 706 firms with 
8’586 observations between 1982 and 2002. The panel is unbalanced and not all firms are 
present in all the observation years. 
3.2 Definition of leverage 
Similar to competing capital structure theories, there is no clear-cut definition of “lever-
age” in the academic literature. The specific choice depends on the objective of the analysis. 
As Bevan and Danboldt (2002) document, the determinants of leverage vary significantly 
depending upon which component of debt is being analyzed. Following Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), we apply two alternative measures of leverage. The first and broadest definition of 
leverage is the ratio of total (non-equity) liabilities to total assets, denoted as LVLTA. This 
definition can be viewed as a proxy of what is left to shareholders in case of liquidation. 
However, this measure also includes current liabilities, which are used for transaction pur-
poses rather than for financing.19 Therefore, this measure is likely to overstate the amount of 
leverage. 
An alternative, and possibly more appropriate definition of leverage is the ratio of interest 
bearing debt to capital, where capital is defined as total debt plus equity, denoted as LVDC. 
This measure of leverage incorporates the employed capital and therefore best represents the 
effects of past financing decisions. It most directly relates to the agency problems associated 
with debt, as brought forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977). 
An additional issue is whether leverage should be computed as the ratio of book or the 
market values of debt and equity. Fama and French (2002) argue that most of the theoretical 
predictions apply to book value based measures of leverage. Similarly, Thies and Klock 
(1992) suggest that book values better reflect the management’s target debt ratios, because the 
                                                
19 Note, however, that maturity management of creditors and debtors, e.g., charging fast and paying slow, can be 
interpreted as short-term financing activities. 
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market value of equity is also dependent on a number of factors that are out of direct control 
of the firm. Therefore, using market values may not reflect the underlying alterations initiated 
by the firm’s decision makers. Furthermore, from a more pragmatic point of view, the market 
value of debt is often not readily available (especially for small firms) and the calculation of 
market values of debt is cumbersome. However, there are some caveats to using book value 
based measures of leverage. First, book values of equity do not represent a firm’s condition 
correctly: put simply, the book value of equity is determined through the difference between 
the left and the right-hand side of the balance sheet. It can therefore even be negative.20 Sec-
ond, international accounting rules imply that book values of equity grow with strong cash 
flows and shrink with depreciation. It comes at no surprise that profitability and tangibility of 
assets are strong predictors of book value based leverage ratios (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and My-
ers, 1999. See also section 4). Third, book value based measures of leverage are generally less 
volatile and therefore overstate the importance of corporate issuing activity. Finally, market 
value based measures better reflect the relative ownership between debt and equity holders 
and are the primary input into wheighted average cost of capital calculations (e.g., Miller and 
Modigliani, 1958). Lastly, Bowman (1980) finds strong positive correlation between market 
and book based leverage measures. Considering all these arguments, we report both book and 
quasi-market debt ratios. In the quasi-market debt ratios, we replace the book value of equity 
by the market value of equity while debt is still at its book value. 
[ insert table 1 here] 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A in table 1 contains summary statistics for the determinants of capital structure. The 
exact definitions of the variables are as follows. First, TANG is the ratio of fixed to total as-
sets. Second, following Titman and Wessels (1988), we measure firm size as the natural loga-
rithm of sales (SIZE). The logarithmic transformation accounts for the conjecture that small 
firms are particularly affected by the size effect.21 Third, GROWTH is measured as the ratio 
of market to book equity. Simple cash flow valuation models suggest that this is a forward 
looking measure. Several empirical studies motivate the use of the ratio of research and de-
velopment (R&D) expenditures to total assets as a measure for expected investment (and thus 
                                                
20 An ad-hoc inspection of our data reveals that 129 observations or 1.5% of our 8’586 observations exhibit 
negative equity capital values. 
21 Alternatively, one could use total assets as a proxy for firm size. However, we have to choose between two 
evils. Both total assets and net sales are heavily affected by accounting regulations and/or manipulation. 
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growth, e.g., Fama and French, 2002). Unfortunately, we do not have this data item available 
for most of our firms in the sample because accounting regulations require firms to expel 
R&D costs only since the early 2000s. Alternatively, we could also use past growth rates of 
total assets. However, we think this measure is not appropriate because historical growth is 
not necessarily linked to future growth (e.g., Chan, Karkeski and Lakonishok, 2003). Fourth, 
return on assets (ROA) is defined as the ratio of pre tax profit over total assets. Finally, we 
use the ratio of total depreciation over total assets as a measure of non-debt taxshields (TAX). 
Panel B of table 1 presents the summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables while 
panels C and D contain the descriptive statistics for our debt ratio definitions and the distance 
measure that we use as determinants of speed of adjustment. Since the business cycle vari-
ables were already discussed in detail in section 2.3. and are well known as well as properly 
documented in the academic literature, we omit a detailed discussion. 
[insert figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the four debt ratio measures for the 1983 to 2002 periods 
as well as the number of observations by period. Some remarks are in order. First, indepen-
dent of the definition of leverage, the changes in average book leverage are small over the 
period considered. Even during the prosperous years in the 1990s, where market leverage 
ratios declined sharply, book value based definitions remain almost unchanged at about 0.6. 
Second, average market leverage declined from 1983 to 1990 and from 1993 to 1999 and they 
increased sharply between 1990 and 1993 and at the beginning of the 2000s. This can be 
explained by the harsh changes in stock market capitalization in these periods. Third, and 
most important regarding our capital structure dynamics investigation, cross-sectional disper-
sion in all four debt ratio definitions increases from around 17% at the beginning of the sam-
ple period to 25% in the final sample period. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Determinants of target leverage 
The estimation of our dynamic model in (5) crucially depends on the correct specification 
of target leverage. We test our basic specification of the target debt ratio in equation (1) by 
running fixed effects regressions. Fixed effects regressions preserve the time series variation 
in leverage, but ignore most of the cross-sectional differences among firms. There is one ca-
veat to mention, though: leverage is sticky. A firm with higher-than-predicted leverage in one 
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year is likely to have higher-than-predicted leverage in the next year. This stickiness in finan-
cial policy may lead to inflated test statistics. Therefore, we add a dummy variable for each 
year to estimate a combined time and firm fixed effects regression model. The additional 
dummies control for variables that are constant across entities but evolve over time. This 
combined model eliminates an omitted variables bias arising both from unobserved variables 
that are constant over time and from unobserved variables that are constant across firms. Ta-
ble 2 displays the estimation results. 
[ insert Table 2 about here ] 
Our results reveal that tangibility (TANG) is always positively correlated with leverage 
and all but one of the coefficients are significant at the 5% level of significance. This supports 
the prediction of the trade-off theory that debt-capacity increases with the proportion of tangi-
ble assets on the balance sheet. Firm size (SIZE) is also positively related to leverage, indicat-
ing that size is a proxy for a low probability of default, as suggested by the trade-off theory. 
All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. We further find a highly significant negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage for all definitions of leverage at book and 
market values, strengthening the theoretical predictions of the pecking order theory. In all but 
one definition we find a significantly negative relationship between non-debt tax shields 
(TAX) and leverage. This result supports the prediction of the trade-off theory and is consis-
tent with the results in Fama and French (2002). The results on the coefficients of the growth 
opportunities variable (GROWTH) are mixed. We find highly significant positive coefficients 
for both leverage ratio definitions at book values, and significantly negative ones for leverage 
ratios at market values. While the latter result is consistent with both the trade-off theory and 
an extended version of the pecking order theory (e.g., Fama and French, 2002), the former 
supports a simple version of the pecking order theory, because debt typically grows when 
investment exceeds retained earnings. Given a limited profitability of growth firms, book lev-
erage increases with increasing investment opportunities. 
A Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that all explanatory variables are simultaneously 
equal to zero. Additionally, we report a Hausman (1978) test statistic, where the null hypothe-
sis states the equivalence of the fixed effects estimator and the random effects estimator. As 
stated at the bottom of table 2, the Hausman test statistic rejects this null hypothesis, which is 
usually interpreted in favor of the fixed effects model. Overall, these preliminary results are 
comparable to previous empirical work (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 
2002; Drobetz and Fix, 2005) and indicate that our capital structure variables are appropriate 
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to model the time-varying target debt ratio in a dynamic adjustment model. This is crucial, 
because most information contained in the panel data set is cross-sectional. However, cross-
sectional information is ignored when introducing firm specific effects, as only deviations 
from means (or differences in time) remain. 
4.2 Determinants of adjustment speed 
In this section we report the dynamic panel estimation results from equation (5), which 
compounds our main hypothesis regarding the time-variations in adjustment speed. Dynamic 
panel data estimation using GMM (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) allows us to estimate all 
coefficients in equation (5) simultaneously. We do not use the fitted values from estimating 
the target debt ratio in equation (1) and table 2, but rather estimate all 
! 
"  and 
! 
"  parameters in 
one single step. Our main focus lies on the estimate of 
! 
"
1
, which is the coefficient on the in-
teraction term between a determinant variable of adjustment speed, 
! 
Z
it
, and lagged leverage, 
! 
LV
it"1
. As laid out in section 2.1, we use the determinant variables of adjustment speed in our 
estimations only separately one at a time to keep the estimation problem tractable and to 
avoid multicollinearity problems. In unreported results, pairwise correlation analysis indicates 
that the latter problem is particularly important with macroeconomic variables. Therefore, for 
each specification in the remaining tables, we test the null hypothesis that 
! 
"
1
= 0, i.e., the 
speed of adjustment is constant and independent from a particular firm characteristic or a 
business cycle variable. We include a full specification of a model including all adjustment 
speed determinants as a robustness check. In addition to our specification tests laid out in sec-
tion 2.1, we report the coefficient of this interaction term, 
! 
"
1
, together with the coefficient on 
the lagged debt ratio, denoted as 
! 
1"#
0( ) . Note that equation (5) specifies a negative sign on 
! 
"
1
. Therefore, the signs of the respective estimates for the coefficients of the interaction terms 
must be interpreted accordingly, i.e., a negative (positive) sign means faster (slower) adjust-
ment. 
Table 3 summarizes the impact of our firm-specific adjustment factors on the speed of ad-
justment. Most important, similar to Lööf (2004) and Banjeree, Heshmati and Wihlborg 
(2004), we find a statistically strong positive relationship between the speed of adjustment 
and the distance variable (DIST). This result supports the notion that firms' cost of maintain-
ing a sub-optimal leverage ratio are higher than the cost of adjustment. Followingly, firms 
adjust faster if they are further away from the target leverage. Second, our findings for the 
impact of SIZE and GROWTH support the hypotheses that larger firms and firms with more 
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growth opportunities exhibit higher financial flexibility through relative cost advantages 
and/or adjustments in external growth funding and thus adjust faster. Especially the results for 
SIZE are statistically strong and are in line with findings by Lööf (2004), Banjeree, Heshmati 
and Wihlborg (2004) as well as by Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006). Furthermore, the full 
model specification including all three speed determinants confirms the results for SIZE and 
GROWTH: not only are the estimates comparable to those in the single case but also remain 
highly significant. However, the results for DIST are mixed. 
[ insert Table 3 about here ] 
Table 4 contains the results of the impact of our macroeconomic variables on the adjust-
ment speed. Consistent with our hypotheses, the coefficients on the interaction terms related 
to ISHORT and TED are estimated significantly positive (indicating lower adjustment speed). 
Because higher interest rates (ISHORT) and a higher TED indicate that economic prospects 
are worse, this result confirms the notion by Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) that ad-
justment speed is lower in economic contractions than in expansions. Our results for CREDIT 
are reassuring, although the coefficient needs some explanation. Our finding implies that 
firms adjust faster if current default risk is high. We interpret this result according to Chen 
(1991), where current default risk is shown to be a variable to explain past economic circum-
stances in up to four quarters. Accordingly, we expect better future prospects after phases of 
high default risk and therefore faster readjustment. Unfortunately, the results for TERM are 
not significant and leave no room for interpretation. Finally, the results for the full model 
specification including all four variables confirm the strong findings of CREDIT and TED. 
The weak results for ISHORT and TERM can be explained by partial multicollinarity al-
though we find strong results in one leverage definition. However, the z2 test statistics indi-
cate that the estimates in the full model specifications are not consistent due to significant 
second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Ultimately, it is important to note 
that a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the determinants of the tar-
get debt ratio are jointly zero in all models, indicating that the target leverage is properly 
specified. 
[ insert Table 4 about here ] 
We further explore the case of book- vs. market value-based leverage measures. This ex-
tended analysis allows us to investigate the notion that firms try to rebalance their capital 
structure (e.g., Leary and Roberts, 2005; Chen and Zhao, 2005). It is often argued that market 
valuations of equity are beyond the influence of management and are thus a weak measure of 
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leverage; treasury management generally concentrates on book leverage. Furthermore, while 
making the case for market leverage, Welch (2004) reports that firms do not rebalance their 
capital structure after changes in market valuation and that the variation in stock returns ac-
counts for most of the (market) leverage variation. Table 7 contains the coefficients on the 
interaction term between past book leverage, 
! 
LV
it"1
, and relative change in market leverage 
from t-2 to t-1, LVCHNG. 
 [ insert Table 5 about here ] 
Contrary to what we would expect according to the notion of the lesser importance of book 
leverage and the Welch (2004) argument, we find a positive relationship between adjustment 
speed and past change in market leverage. This finding implies that a large variation in past 
market leverage leads to faster adjustment to target book leverage. Thus, firms do tend to 
rebalance their book capital structure after sharp changes in market leverage (lending support 
to evidence by Leary and Roberts, 2005). Furthermore, large changes in leverage (both book 
and market leverage) do not significantly affect the adjustment speed in market leverage ra-
tios. We thus conclude that firms are more concerned with book leverage ratios than with 
market leverage ratios: they do not counteract variations in market value-based leverage im-
mediately, but adjust their book leverage ratios after large swings in market leverage. 
An important issue brought forward by Korajczyk and Levy (2003) is that results should 
differ for subsamples of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Given that a firm's 
access to financial markets is expected to influence its capital structure choice and financial 
constraints clearly have a macroeconomic dimension, we split our sample in two categories, 
depending on whether a firm is financially constrained or unconstrained.22 Financially con-
strained firms cannot postpone adjustment in either state of high or low. Accordingly, there 
should not be any significant relationship between the speed of adjustment and both the credit 
spread (CREDIT) and the TED spread (TED) for financially constrained firms. 
[ insert Table 6 about here ] 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) define a firm as financially constrained if it does not have suf-
ficient funds to undertake investment opportunities and if it faces severe agency costs when 
accessing financial markets. Although this classification is straight-forward, it lacks a balance 
sheet-based criteria. We therefore include the current ratio as the second criteria. This ratio is 
                                                
22 Note that a sample split-up allows that all coefficients in the model are different between the two subsamples, 
whereas a dummy variable approach usually only allows that selected coefficients differ between the subsam-
ples. 
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of high importance when dealing with banks (in fact, the classification we use refers to the so 
called “Banker’s Rule”, e.g. Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 2004) and is an important indicator 
of a firms’ ability to meet its short-term debt obligations. The current ratio is given through 
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Therefore, we classify a firm as financially 
constrained if in a given year a firm has (i) a Tobin's Q greater than one and (ii) a current ratio 
of less than 2. All firm-events that are considered financially constrained constitute the first 
subsample and all the other firm events fall into the financially unconstrained subsample. This 
algorithm classifies a total of 1’833 observations in 356 different firms as “financially con-
strained”. The time-series restriction of at least 3 consecutive firm years leaves us with a 
sample of 193 firms with 870 firm years. Tables 6 and 7 report all the coefficients our analy-
sis for the two subsamples. 
[ insert Table 7 about here ] 
Overall, our empirical results show a coherent picture. Although not all coefficients on ad-
justment speed determinants are estimated as predicted, there is a clear tendency that capital 
structure adjustment of financially constrained firms is affected differently of both firm char-
acteristics and macroeconomic conditions. First, our results for the firm characteristic vari-
ables are reassuring. While firm size (SIZE) and distance to target leverage (DIST) are esti-
mated insignificantly, growth opportunities still have a significant impact on adjustment 
speed in market leverage ratios, further strengthening the notion that growth firms exhibit 
higher financial flexibility through adjustments in external investment financing. Overall, we 
find a stronger negative relationships between ISHORT and the adjustment speed of finan-
cially constrained firms, lending support to the notion that especially constrained firms are hit 
harder by bad states than financially unconstrained firms. However, the default and global 
political risk premia (CREDIT and TED) are again a little harder to interpret. Although we 
find no significant relationship with TED, CREDIT still largely determines adjustment speed 
of financially constrained firms. We again argument according to Chen (1991) and expect 
faster adjustment of financially constrained firms after phases of higher default risk. In con-
trast, financially unconstrained firms are rather influenced by global political risk (TED) and 
not by local default risk. Overall, our evidence for the Korajczyk and Levy (2003) argument 
is weak at best. However, we find strong evidence that the capital structure adjustment behav-
ior of financially constrained firms is determined differently from the behavior of financially 
unconstrained firms. 
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5. Conclusion 
Empirical evidence as well as survey response indicates that capital structure choice lies at 
the very heart of corporate financial decision making. The interdependence between leverage 
ratios and firm characteristics has usually been described in favor of one of the traditional 
capital structure theories, e.g. the trade-off theory or the pecking order theory. However, these 
models do not characterize the nature of the adjustment process towards target leverage ratios. 
Firm temporarily deviate from their target capital structure and then gradually work back in a 
seemingly random manner. In fact, in the presence of market imperfections, adjustment to 
target is costly and it may be cheaper for firms not to fully adjust to their target even if they 
recognize that their current leverage ratio is not optimal. Nevertheless, there is surprisingly 
little empirical evidence on the determinants of a time-varying speed of adjustment to target 
leverage and about the influence of macroeconomic variables on the adjustment process in 
particular. As a matter of fact, a broader body of literature devoted to partial capital structure 
adjustments has been developed only recently (e.g., Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Drobetz and 
Wanzenried, 2006, Drobetz, Pensa and Wanzenried, 2006). 
We present a dynamic model that endogenizes both the target leverage ratio and the speed 
of adjustment. Using a dynamic adjustment model and panel methodology for a sample of 
706 non-financial firms from Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom over the period 
from 1982 to 2002, we are able to provide further evidence (i) on the determinants of the tar-
get capital structure rather than observed capital structure and (ii) on the determinants of ad-
justment speed. Most important, we analyze the effects of firm-specific characteristics as well 
as macroeconomic factors on the speed of adjustment to target leverage. We document that 
faster growing firms and larger firms adjust more readily, lending support to the notion that 
especially these firms exhibit higher financial flexibility and/or cost advantages over their 
peers. Furthermore, we document that firms that are further away from target leverage adjust 
faster. Our results further reveal interesting relations between the speed of adjustment and 
well-known business cycle variables. Most important, the speed of adjustment is higher if 
interest rates are low and the risks of disruption in the global financial system are negligible. 
Additionally, we shed new light capital structure rebalancing arguments. Our results reveal 
that a large swing in market leverage ratios leads to faster adjustment in book leverage ratios 
in the following period. Finally, we document that financial constraints clearly affect capital 
structure decisions: firm characteristics and the distance to target leverage do not affect the 
speed of adjustment of financially constrained firms. Only faster growing financially con-
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strained firms adjust faster, lending further support to the notion that growth firms exhibit 
higher financial flexibility through changes in external growth financing. Furthermore, finan-
cially constrained firms are hit harder by unfavorable macroeconomic conditions and cannot 
take advantage of favorable conditions in the same manner than unconstrained firms can. 
 26 
References 
Andrés Alonso, P., F. López Iturriaga, and J. Rodríguez Sanz, 2005, Financial decisions and 
growth opportunities: A spanish firm’s panel data analysis, Applied Financial Economics 15, 
391-407. 
Ang, J., J. Chua, and C. McConell, 1982, The administrative costs of corporate bankruptcy: 
A note, Journal of Finance 37, 219-226. 
Arellano, M., and S. Bond, 1991, Some tests for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations, Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-297. 
Baker, M., and J. Wurgler, 2002, Market timing and capital structure, Journal of Finance 62, 
1-32. 
Baker, M., R. Greenwood, and J. Wurgler, 2003, The maturity of debt issues and predictable 
variation in bond returns, Journal of Financial Economics 70, 261-291. 
Banjeree, S., A. Heshmati, and C. Whilborg, 2004, The dynamics of capital structure, Re-
search in Banking and Finance 4, 275-297. 
Bevan, A., and J. Danboldt, 2002, Capital structure and its determinants in the UK: A de-
composition analysis, Applied Financial Economics 12, 159-170. 
Bhaduri, S. 2002, Determinants of capital structure choice: A study of the indian corporate 
sector, Applied Financial Economics 12, 159-170. 
Bowman, R., 1980, The importance of a market value measurement of debt in assessing lev-
erage, Journal of Accounting Research 18, 242-254. 
Brounen, D., A. de Jong, and R. Kloedijk, 2004, Corporate finance in Europe: Confronting 
theory and practice, Financial Management, 71-101. 
Chan, L., J. Karkeski, and J. Lakonishok, 2003, The level of persistence of growth rates, 
Journal of Finance 58, 644-684. 
Chen, L., and X. Zhao, 2005, Profitability, mean reversion of leverage ratios, and capital 
structure choices, Working Paper, Michigan State University. 
Chen, N., 1991, Financial investment opportunities and the macroeconomy, Journal of Fi-
nance 46, 529-554. 
De Miguel, A., and J. Pindado, 2001, Determinants of the capital structure: New evidence 
from Spanish data, Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 77-99. 
Dittmar, A., and A. Tharok, 2006, Why do firms issue equity?, Journal of Finance, forthcom-
ing. 
Drobetz, W., and G. Wanzenried, 2006, What determines the speed of adjustment to the tar-
get capital structure?, Applied Financial Economics 16, 941-958. 
Drobetz, W., and R. Fix, 2005, What are the determinants of the capital structure? Some evi-
dence from Switzerland, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 141, 71-113. 
Drobetz, W., P. Pensa and C.B. Wöhle, 2006, Kapitalstruktur in Theorie und Praxis: Er-
gebnisse einer Fragebogenuntersuchung, Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (ZfB), 76(3), 253-
285. 
Drobetz, W., P. Pensa and G. Wanzenried, 2006, Firm charactistics and dynamic capital 
structure adjustment, SSRN Working paper #952268. 
 27 
Easterbrook, F., 1984, Two-agency cost explanations of dividends, American Economic Re-
view 74, 650-659. 
Estrella, A., and G. Hardouvelis, 1991, The Term Structure as a Predictor of Real Economic 
Activity, Journal of Finance 46, 555-576. 
Fama, E., and K. French, 2002, Testing tradeoff and pecking order predictions about divi-
dends and debt, Review of Financial Studies 15, 1-33. 
Ferson, W., and C. Harvey, 1993, The risk and predictability of international equity returns, 
Review of Financial Studies 6, 527-566. 
Fischer, E., R. Heinkel, and J. Zechner, 1989, Dynamic capital structure choice: Theory and 
tests, Journal of Finance 44, 19-44. 
Flannery, M.J., and K.P. Rangan, 2006, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 469-506. 
Galai, D., and R. Masulis, 1976, The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock, Jour-
nal of Financial Economics 3, 631-644. 
Graham, J., and C. Harvey, 2001, The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence 
from the field, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243. 
Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1982, Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives, in: 
McCall, J. (ed.), The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, University of Chicago 
Press. 
Hackbarth, D., J. Miao, and E. Morrellec, 2006, Capital structure, credit risk and macroeco-
nomic conditions, Journal of Financial Economics 82, 519-550. 
Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1991, The theory of capital structure, Journal of Finance 46, 297-
355. 
Harvey, C., 1991, The term spread and world economic growth, Journal of Fixed Income, 7-
19. 
Hausman, J., 1978, Specification tests in econometrics, Econometrica 46, 1251-1272. 
Henderson, B., N. Jegadeesh, and M. Weisbach, 2005, World markets for raising new capi-
tal, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Heshmati, A., 2001, The dynamics of capital structure: Evidence from Swedish micro and 
small firms, Research in Banking and Finance, 2, 199-241. 
Hovakimian, A., T. Opler, and S. Titman, 2001, The debt-equity choice, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 36, 1-24. 
Jalilvand, A., and R. Harris, 1984, Corporate behavior in adjusting to capital structure and 
dividend targets: An econometric study, Journal of Finance 39, 127-144. 
Jensen, G., D. Solberg, and T. Zorn, 1992, Simultaneous determination of insider ownership, 
debt, and dividend policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, 247-263. 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, 
and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
Jensen, M., 1986, Agency costs of free cash flows, corporate finance and takeovers, Ameri-
can Economic Review 76, 323-339. 
Korajczyk, R. A. and A. Levy, 2003, Capital structure choice: Macroeconomic conditions 
and financial constraints, Journal of Financial Economics 68, 75-109. 
Leary, M. and M. Roberts, 2005, Do Firms rebalance their capitals structure, Journal of Fi-
 28 
nance 60, 2575 - 2619. 
Levy, A., 2001, Why does capital structure vary with macroeconomic conditions?, Working 
Paper, Haas School of Business. 
Lintner, J., 1956, Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings 
and taxes, American Economic Review, 97-113. 
Lööf, H., 2004, Dynamic optimal capital structure and technical change, Structural Change 
and Economic Dynamics 15, 449-468. 
Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory 
of investment, American Economic Review 48, 261-297. 
Myers, S., 1977, The determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Finance 32, 147-175. 
Myers, S., 1984, The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance 39, 575-592. 
Nickel, S., 1981, Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects, Econometrica 49, 1399-1416. 
Panno, A., 2003, An empirical investigation of the determinants of capital structure: The UK 
and Italian experience, Applied Financial Economics 13, 1421-1460. 
Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, 1995, What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence 
from international data, Journal of Finance 50, 1421-1460. 
Ross, S., 1977, The determination of financial structure: The incentive signaling approach, 
Bell Journal of Economics 26, 393-415. 
Ross, S., R. Westerfield and J. Jaffe, 2004, Corporate Finance, 7th edition, New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Sargan, J.D., 1958, The estimation of economic relationships using instrumental variables, 
Econometrica 26, 393-415. 
Shyam-Sunder, L., and S. Myers, 1999, Testing static trade-off against pecking order models 
of capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 219-244. 
Thies, C., and M. Klock, 1992, Determinants of capital structure, Review of Financial Eco-
nomics 1, 40-52. 
Titman, S., and R. Wessels, 1988, The Determinants of capital structure choice, Journal of 
Finance 43, 1.19. 
Verbeek, M., A guide to modern econometrics, 2nd edition, New York: Wiley & Sons. 
Wanzenried, G., 2006, Capital structure dynamics in the UK and continental Europe, Euro-
pean Journal of Finance, 693-716. 
Warner, J., 1977, Bankruptcy costs: Some evidence, Journal of Finance 32, 337-347. 
Welch, I., 2004, Capital Structure and Stock Returns, Journal of Political Economy 112, 106-
131. 
 
 29 
Table 1: Debt ratio and sample dynamics 
 
The figure graphs the annual averages of our main debt ratio definitions LVLTA and LVDC (lines, left-hand 
scale) and annual observation count (bars, right-hand scale). LVLTA is the ratio of total (nonequity) liabilities to 
total assets, and LVDC is the ratio of total interest bearing debt to capital, where capital is defined as total debt 
plus equity. For the market values of leverage the book value of equity is replaced by the market value of equity. 
 30 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Stdev.  Mean Median Stdev. 
Panel A: Capital structure determinants 
Tangibility, TANG 0.354 0.305 0.232     
Firm size, SIZE 13.386 13.466 1.892     
Growth opportunities, GROWTH 1.718 1.291 1.701     
Profitability, ROA 0.079 0.071 0.099     
Non-debt tax shields, TAX 0.046 0.041 0.033     
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables 
Short interest rate, ISHORT 0.067 0.060 0.030     
Term spread, TERM 0.005 0.009 0.015     
Credit spread, CREDIT 0.014 0.017 0.017     
T-Bill Eurodollar (TED) spread 0.005 0.006 0.003     
Stock market return, STOCKS 0.142 0.165 0.208     
Dividend yield, DY 0.026 0.024 0.009     
Panel C: Debt ratio measures 
 Book values  Market values 
LVLTA 0.623 0.629 0.185  0.483 0.466 0.239 
LVDC 0.609 0.595 0.209  0.474 0.425 0.271 
Panel D: Target deviation measures 
 Book values  Market values 
DISTLVLTA 0.135 0.110 0.109  0.159 0.141 0.115 
DISTLVDC 0.162 0.132 0.123  0.195 0.170 0.140 
The table reports descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. TANG is the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of net sales, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book equity, ROA is the pre 
tax profit over total assets and TAX is the ratio of depreciation over total assets. DIST is the difference between 
the target and the current leverage ratio, where target leverage is constructed as the fitted value of a fixed-effect 
regression of the leverage ratio on the five capital structure determinants TANG, SIZE, GROWTH, ROA and 
TAX. ISHORT is the 3-month money market interest rate, TERM is the difference between the yield of govern-
ment bonds with a maturity of at least 10 years and ISHORT, CREDIT is the difference between the yields of 
AAA rated corporate bonds and government bonds and TED is the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar 
rate for U.S. Dollars and the 90-day yield on U.S. Treasury bills. STOCKS and DY are the run-up annual stock 
market return and the run-up average annual dividend yield, respectively. 
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Table 2: Fixed effects regression for capital structure determinants 
 LVLTA LVDC 
 Book values Market values Book values Market values 
TANGit 0.039*** 
(0.126) 
0.081*** 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.035** 
(0.015) 
SIZEit 0.058*** 
(0.002) 
0.057*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
GROWTHit 0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.026*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.022*** 
(0.001) 
ROAit -0.309*** 
(0.014) 
-0.506*** 
(0.016) 
-0.246*** 
(0.016) 
-0.465*** 
(0.017) 
TAXit -0.036 
(0.068) 
-0.465*** 
(0.075) 
-0.354*** 
(0.077) 
-0.813*** 
(0.081) 
constant -0.191*** 
(0.028) 
-0.237*** 
(0.031) 
0.489*** 
(0.032) 
0.424*** 
(0.034) 
R2 within 0.155 0.311 0.042 0.232 
R2 between 0.228 0.493 0.034 0.338 
R2 overall 0.200 0.400 0.058 0.278 
Wald test 1642.71*** (24) 4287.54*** (24) 371.91*** (24) 2640.51*** (24) 
Hausman test 123.97*** (23) 176.20*** (23) 104.60*** (23) 178.62*** (23) 
Observations 8561 8561 8561 8561 
Groups 705 705 705 705 
The table reports the results for fixed effects panel regressions of the leverage ratio on firm-specific capital struc-
ture determinants. LVLTA is the ratio of total (nonequity) liabilities to total assets, and LVDC is the ratio of 
total debt to capital, where capital is defined as total debt plus equity. For the market values of leverage the book 
value of equity is replaced by the market value of equity. TANG is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of net sales, GROWTH is the ratio of market to book equity, ROA is the pre tax profit 
over total assets and TAX is the ratio of depreciation over total assets. Firm-specific and time-specific effects are 
included. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%/5%/10% level are marked with ***/**/*. Ro-
bust standard errors are in brackets. Numbers in brackets for the Wald and Hausman test denote the degrees of 
freedom. 
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Table 3: Firm-specific adjustment factors 
 Book values Market values 
Panel A: LVLTA 
LVit-1 1.239*** 
(0.205) 
0.496*** 
(0.037) 
0.488*** 
(0.064) 
1.170*** 
(0.227) 
1.176*** 
(0.165) 
0.495*** 
(0.068) 
0.633*** 
(0.039) 
1.486*** 
(0.160) 
LVit-1 × SIZEit -0.061*** 
(0.016) 
  -0.061*** 
(0.018) 
-0.058*** 
(0.012) 
  -0.060*** 
(0.012) 
LVit-1 × GROWTHit  0.007 
(0.004) 
 -0.002 
(0.006) 
 -0.115*** 
(0.048) 
 -0.235*** 
(0.025) 
LVit-1 × DISTit   0.062 
(0.185) 
0.116 
(0.146) 
  -0.738*** 
(0.110) 
-0.138 
(0.122) 
Wald test 488.60*** 657.28*** 529.65*** 694.12*** 657.68*** 796.87*** 743.78*** 1029.0*** 
z2 -1.64 -0.97 -1.19 -0.99 -1.11 0.07 -0.52 -0.92 
Sargan test 555.73 548.89 548.78 639.47 548.06 559.11 560.00 628.19 
Panel B: LVDC 
LVit-1 0.887*** 
(0.215) 
0.550*** 
(0.038) 
0.533*** 
(0.082) 
1.057*** 
(0.222) 
1.000*** 
(0.201) 
0.536*** 
(0.042) 
0.690*** 
(0.048) 
1.343*** 
(0.174) 
LVit-1 × SIZEit -0.034*** 
(0.017) 
  -0.044*** 
(0.015) 
-0.040*** 
(0.015) 
  -0.049*** 
(0.012) 
LVit-1 × GROWTHit  -0.020 
(0.017) 
 -0.030* 
(0.018) 
 -0.091*** 
(0.025) 
 -0.160*** 
(0.020) 
LVit-1 × DISTit   -0.307 
(0.365) 
-0.068 
(0.178) 
  -0.615*** 
(0.129) 
-0.185 
(0.120) 
Wald test 267.86*** 379.58*** 389.89*** 444.41*** 667.32*** 663.02*** 678.84*** 1043.9*** 
z2 0.68 0.48 0.54 0.29 -0.88 -0.61 -0.60 -0.61 
Sargan test 550.67 549.55 547.46 630.59 551.28 561.08 554.91 637.53 
Observations 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 
Groups 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 
The table reports the results of estimating equation (5) with the General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Variations in sample size are due to potential data 
limitations. LVLTA is the ratio of total (nonequity) liabilities to total assets, and LVDC is the ratio of total debt 
to capital, where capital is defined as total debt plus equity. For the market values of leverage the book value of 
equity is replaced by the market value of equity. The determinants of the adjustment speed are as follows: SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of net sales; GROWTH is the ratio of market to book equity; DIST is constructed as the 
fitted value of the fixed effects regression of the leverage ratio on the five capital structure determinants TANG, 
SIZE, GROWTH, ROA and TAX. The table shows the coefficients on the lagged leverage ratio and on the inter-
action term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged leverage ratio. Coefficients significantly 
different from zero at the 1%/5%/10% level are marked with ***/**/*. Robust standard errors are in brackets. 
The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants of target debt ratio 
are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in the residu-
als. The Sargan test statistics refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid and uses 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step estimator. 
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 Table 4: Macroeconomic adjustment factors 
 Book values Market values 
Panel A: LVLTA 
LVit-1 0.410*** 
(0.060) 
0.521*** 
(0.033) 
0.501*** 
(0.036) 
0.487*** 
(0.043) 
0.400*** 
(0.110) 
0.332*** 
(0.043) 
0.459*** 
(0.026) 
0.469*** 
(0.025) 
0.438*** 
(0.035) 
0.507*** 
(0.084) 
LVit-1 × ISHORTit 1.249*** 
(0.539) 
   -0.203 
(1.290) 
1.511*** 
(0.464) 
   -1.054 
(0.994) 
LVit-1 × TERMit  0.022 
(0.735) 
  -0.349 
(1.576) 
 -1.082 
(0.686) 
  -1.223 
(1.205) 
LVit-1 × CREDITit   -2.521** 
(1.128) 
 -4.561** 
(1.965) 
  -1.494* 
(0.763) 
 -2.875** 
(1.288) 
LVit-1 × TEDit    7.473*** 
(3.049) 
17.20*** 
(4.049) 
   2.144*** 
(2.730) 
6.139* 
(3.277) 
Wald test 762.0*** 552.3*** 676.0*** 523.3*** 990.3*** 881.8*** 781.5*** 935.3*** 968.9*** 1419*** 
z2 -1.56 -1.65* -1.60 -1.72* -2.47** -1.07 -0.73 -1.19 -1.87* -2.78*** 
Sargan test 549.51 552.50 546.70 395.12 620.30 551.51 545.85 556.44 443.34 963.82 
Panel B: LVDC 
LVit-1 0.398*** 
(0.078) 
0.489*** 
(0.061) 
0.484*** 
(0.056) 
0.465*** 
(0.059) 
0.111 
(0.172) 
0.479*** 
(0.038) 
0.527*** 
(0.026) 
0.531*** 
(0.025) 
0.479*** 
(0.032) 
0.389*** 
(0.077) 
LVit-1 × ISHORTit 1.149*** 
(0.421) 
   2.921* 
(1.622) 
0.554*** 
(0.015) 
   0.743 
(0.934) 
LVit-1 × TERMit  1.106 
(0.740) 
  3.678* 
(2.007) 
 0.702 
(0.563) 
  1.546 
(1.009) 
LVit-1 × CREDITit   -2.593*** 
(0.788) 
 -1.450 
(1.608) 
  -0.857* 
(0.470) 
 -0.784 
(1.124) 
LVit-1 × TEDit    7.905*** 
(2.463) 
14.09*** 
(3.137) 
   5.039*** 
(2.039) 
6.797*** 
(2.401) 
Wald test 381.8*** 305.6*** 344.1*** 301.2*** 563.1*** 734.6*** 764.9*** 782.4*** 874.0*** 1226*** 
z2 0.44 0.50 0.25 0.56 -0.15 -1.41 -0.99 -1.17 -1.80* -2.17** 
Sargan test 554.89 554.71 565.27 399.42 616.80 563.39 556.20 564.90 435.90 619.78 
Observations 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 6454 
Groups 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 660 
The table reports the results of estimating equation (5) with the General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Variations in sample size are due to potential data 
limitations. LVLTA is the ratio of total (nonequity) liabilities to total assets, and LVDC is the ratio of total debt 
to capital, where capital is defined as total debt plus equity. For the market values of leverage the book value of 
equity is replaced by the market value of equity. The determinants of the adjustment speed are as follows: 
ISHORT is the 3-month money market interest rate, TERM is the difference between the yield of government 
bonds with a maturity of at least 10 years and ISHORT, CREDIT is the difference between the yields of AAA 
rated corporate bonds and government bonds, TED is the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar rate for 
U.S. Dollars and the 90-day yield on U.S. Treasury bills. The table shows the coefficients on the lagged leverage 
ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged leverage ratio. Coeffi-
cients significantly different from zero at the 1%/5%/10% level are marked with ***/**/*. Robust standard er-
rors are in brackets. The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants 
of target debt ratio are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order cor-
relation in the residuals. The Sargan test statistics refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restric-
tions are valid and uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step estimator. 
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Table 5: Impact of past changes in leverage 
 LVLTA LVDC 
 Book value Book value 
LVit-1 0.590*** 
(0.044) 
0.529*** 
(0.064) 
LVit-1 × LVCHNGit, LVLTAM -0.199*** 
(0.059) 
-0.175*** 
(0.055) 
Wald test (χ2) 511.80*** 276.11*** 
z2 -0.91 0.90 
Sargan test 544.72 554.66 
LVit-1 0.558*** 
(0.043) 
0.518*** 
(0.070) 
LVit-1 × LVCHNGit, LVDCM -0.159*** 
(0.052) 
-0.080* 
(0.048) 
Wald test (χ2) 529.54*** 251.73*** 
z2 -1.09 0.84 
Sargan test 560.89 565.94 
Observations 6454 6454 
Groups 660 660 
The table reports the results of estimating equation (5) with the General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Variations in sample size are due to potential data 
limitations. LVLTA is the ratio of total (nonequity) liabilities to total assets, and LVDC is the ratio of total debt 
to capital, where capital is defined as total debt plus equity. For the market values of leverage the book value of 
equity is replaced by the market value of equity. LVCHNG is the relative change in leverage from period t-2 to 
t-1. The table shows the coefficients on the lagged leverage ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant 
of adjustment speed with the lagged leverage ratio. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 
1%/5%/10% level are marked with ***/**/*. Robust standard errors are in brackets. The Wald test statistic re-
fers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants of target debt ratio are jointly equal to zero. 
The test statistic z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in the residuals. The Sargan test sta-
tistics refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid and uses the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) two-step estimator. 
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Table 6: Firm-specific adjustment factors for financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
 Financially unconstrained firms Financially constrained firms 
Panel A: LVLTA, book values 
LVit-1 1.001*** 
(0.205) 
0.380*** 
(0.048) 
0.355*** 
(0.069) 
1.078*** 
(0.238) 
0.172 
(0.275) 
0.307*** 
(0.099) 
0.291*** 
(0.137) 
0.747** 
(0.391) 
LVit-1 × SIZEit -0.053*** 
(0.016) 
  -0.056*** 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.021) 
  -0.032 
(0.026) 
LVit-1 × GROWTHit  -0.022 
(0.022) 
 -0.017 
(0.027) 
 0.016 
(0.018) 
 0.023** 
(0.011) 
LVit-1 × DISTit   -0.026 
(0.197) 
-0.054 
(0.170) 
  0.197 
(0.342) 
-0.038 
(0.292) 
Wald test 293.94*** 385.69*** 346.80*** 492.18*** 461.13*** 653.23*** 120.08*** 1441.4*** 
z2 0.07 -0.00 0.44 -0.03 -1.33 -1.39 -1.66* -1.62 
Sargan test 511.35 522.17 523.59 524.42 179.60 176.86 179.36 157.43 
Panel B: LVLTA, market values 
LVit-1 1.045*** 
(0.172) 
0.716*** 
(0.056) 
0.488*** 
(0.045) 
1.325*** 
(0.159) 
0.385 
(0.377) 
0.336*** 
(0.058) 
0.315*** 
(0.078) 
0.737 
(0.554) 
LVit-1 × SIZEit -0.056*** 
(0.012) 
  -0.046*** 
(0.011) 
-0.018 
(0.028) 
  -0.026 
(0.044) 
LVit-1 × GROWTHit  -0.406*** 
(0.050) 
 -0.388*** 
(0.055) 
 -0.075*** 
(0.020) 
 -0.121*** 
(0.021) 
LVit-1 × DISTit   -0.647*** 
(0.130) 
-0.067 
(0.119) 
  -0.128 
(0.338) 
0.895*** 
(0.307) 
Wald test 472.21*** 938.77*** 607.07*** 1186.8*** 191.35*** 791.48*** 146.59*** 1436.6*** 
z2 0.31 -0.40 -0.04 -0.55 -0.86 -0.53 -0.71 -0.20 
Sargan test 519.90 517.98 521.56 521.45 180.88 177.87 175.42 171.42 
Panel C: LVDC, book values 
LVit-1 1.077*** 
(0.220) 
0.457*** 
(0.042) 
0.386*** 
(0.081) 
1.147*** 
(0.241) 
0.043 
(0.330) 
0.439*** 
(0.085) 
0.426*** 
(0.147) 
1.140** 
(0.470) 
LVit-1 × SIZEit -0.052*** 
(0.016) 
  -0.057*** 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.024) 
  -0.046 
(0.033) 
LVit-1 × GROWTHit  -0.017 
(0.016) 
 -0.055* 
(0.030) 
 -0.034** 
(0.017) 
 -0.034* 
(0.020) 
LVit-1 × DISTit   -0.099 
(0.219) 
0.117 
(0.177) 
  -1.024* 
(0.554) 
-0.753** 
(0.340) 
Wald test 249.19*** 272.29*** 286.02*** 445.14*** 319.25*** 616.63*** 166.83*** 935.08 
z2 0.38 0.09 0.12 -0.05 1.30 1.08 0.45 0.57 
Sargan test 522.12 520.14 517.51 532.04 178.38 175.08 181.66 161.36 
Panel D: LVDC, market values 
LVit-1 1.054*** 
(0.243) 
0.413*** 
(0.038) 
0.577*** 
(0.059) 
1.181*** 
(0.180) 
0.179 
(0.359) 
0.339*** 
(0.056) 
0.372*** 
(0.082) 
 
(0.) 
LVit-1 × SIZEit -0.051*** 
(0.017) 
  -0.046*** 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.026) 
   
(0.) 
LVit-1 × GROWTHit  -0.068*** 
(0.024) 
 -0.131*** 
(0.028) 
 -0.083*** 
(0.018) 
  
(0.) 
LVit-1 × DISTit   -0.524*** 
(0.151) 
-0.184 
(0.120) 
  -0.529 
(0.361) 
 
(0.) 
Wald test 340.22*** 327.67*** 369.12*** 643.81*** 166.30*** 622.45*** 165.47***  
z2 -0.21 -0.21 -0.01 -0.70 -0.38 0.01 -0.25  
Sargan test 515.14 522.77 519.07 582.91 176.54 181.19 175.42  
Observations 4448 4448 4448 4448 870 870 870 870 
Groups 547 547 547 547 193 193 193 193 
The table reports the results of estimating equation (5) with the General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Variations in sample size are due to potential data 
limitations. LVLTA is the ratio of total (nonequity) liabilities to total assets, and LVDC is the ratio of total debt 
to capital, where capital is defined as total debt plus equity. For the market values of leverage the book value of 
equity is replaced by the market value of equity. The determinants of the adjustment speed are as follows: SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of net sales; GROWTH is the ratio of market to book equity; DIST is constructed as the 
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fitted value of the fixed effects regression of the leverage ratio on the five capital structure determinants TANG, 
SIZE, GROWTH, ROA and TAX. An observation is classified as financially constraint if the Tobin’s Q is 
greater than 1 and the current ratio is below 2. The table shows the coefficients on the lagged leverage ratio and 
on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged leverage ratio. Coefficients sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 1%/5%/10% level are marked with ***/**/*. Robust standard errors are in 
brackets. The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the determinants of target 
debt ratio are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second order correlation in 
the residuals. The Sargan test statistics refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid 
and uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step estimator 
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Table 7: Macroeconomic adjustment factors for financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
 Financially unconstrained firms Financially constrained firms 
Panel A: LVLTA, book values 
LVit-1 0.292*** 
(0.058) 
0.362*** 
(0.038) 
0.352*** 
(0.037) 
0.333*** 
(0.048) 
0.275** 
(0.122) 
0.061 
(0.112) 
0.344*** 
(0.059) 
0.456*** 
(0.076) 
0.351*** 
(0.086) 
0.043 
(0.253) 
LVit-1 × ISHORTit 0.811 
(0.554) 
   0.554 
(1.414) 
4.262*** 
(1.515) 
   3.464 
(3.157) 
LVit-1 × TERMit  -0.571 
(0.681) 
  -0.367 
(1.768) 
 0.980 
(1.922) 
  4.406 
(3.505) 
LVit-1 × CREDITit   -1.192 
(1.054) 
 -1.479 
(2.033) 
  -9.486*** 
(2.792) 
 -8.575* 
(4.577) 
LVit-1 × TEDit    4.061 
(3.113) 
8.713*** 
(4.375) 
   2.797 
(8.771) 
20.180** 
(9.347) 
Wald test 509.0*** 352.4*** 547.9*** 262.8*** 782.6*** 81.86*** 93.30*** 48.65*** 78.20*** 230.0*** 
z2 -0.11 -0.57 -0.33 0.04 -1.93* -1.18 -1.15 -1.12 -1.52 -0.94 
Sargan test 521.07 518.00 522.49 385.59 514.30 176.04 172.11 176.03 172.94 160.17 
Panel B: LVLTA, market values 
LVit-1 0.212*** 
(0.044) 
0.350*** 
(0.028) 
0.334*** 
(0.026) 
0.327*** 
(0.037) 
0.453*** 
(0.109) 
-0.026 
(0.097) 
0.227*** 
(0.049) 
0.323*** 
(0.056) 
0.183*** 
(0.062) 
0.435* 
(0.257) 
LVit-1 × ISHORTit 1.477*** 
(0.546) 
   -1.428 
(1.257) 
3.829*** 
(1.108) 
   -3.101 
(3.237) 
LVit-1 × TERMit  -2.322*** 
(0.844) 
  -3.105* 
(1.639) 
 -2.370 
(1.548) 
  -4.273 
(3.701) 
LVit-1 × CREDITit   -0.381 
(0.810) 
 -2.149 
(1.583) 
  -7.026*** 
(1.729) 
 -10.87*** 
(3.952) 
LVit-1 × TEDit    1.441 
(3.221) 
4.362 
(3.684) 
   5.197 
(8.215) 
21.192** 
(9.810) 
Wald test 549.4*** 469.0*** 643.6*** 531.5*** 938.4*** 162.9*** 152.3*** 141.2*** 154.6*** 282.5*** 
z2 0.05 0.18 -0.87 -1.12 -1.92* -0.14 -1.62 0.13 -0.54 -1.78* 
Sargan test 523.79 518.72 518.05 408.70 516.59 176.04 184.60 176.53 172.60 164.54 
Panel C: LVDC, book values 
LVit-1 0.355*** 
(0.051) 
0.434*** 
(0.036) 
0.436*** 
(0.035) 
0.413*** 
(0.044) 
0.033 
(0.124) 
-0.124 
(0.155) 
0.174 
(0.111) 
0.351*** 
(0.126) 
0.104 
(0.185) 
-0.462 
(0.415) 
LVit-1 × ISHORTit 1.092*** 
(0.427) 
   3.893*** 
(1.485) 
4.076*** 
(1.548) 
   8.299* 
(4.545) 
LVit-1 × TERMit  0.316 
(0.586) 
  4.358*** 
(1.589) 
 5.484 
(3.347) 
  12.150** 
(5.999) 
LVit-1 × CREDITit   -1.533** 
(0.759) 
 0.897 
(1.849) 
  -11.55*** 
(2.425) 
 -6.430 
(4.595) 
LVit-1 × TEDit    5.919** 
(2.651) 
6.905* 
(3.578) 
   11.500 
(10.992) 
25.783** 
(10.491) 
Wald test 252.3*** 228.3*** 258.8*** 232.0*** 375.7*** 51.03*** 61.12*** 50.92*** 59.86*** 210.4*** 
z2 -0.11 0.06 -0.12 0.23 -0.79 1.35 1.26 1.16 1.18 1.11 
Sargan test 515.33 524.53 513.90 401.66 525.23 180.11 179.50 181.32 176.52 157.52 
Panel D: LVDC, market values 
LVit-1 0.372*** 
(0.040) 
0.431*** 
(0.029) 
0.426*** 
(0.025) 
0.381*** 
(0.032) 
0.226** 
(0.090) 
-0.028 
(0.101) 
0.211*** 
(0.046) 
0.300*** 
(0.054) 
0.154** 
(0.065) 
0.477* 
(0.257) 
LVit-1 × ISHORTit 0.626* 
(0.373) 
   1.727 
(1.104) 
3.648*** 
(1.219) 
   -3.899 
(3.249) 
LVit-1 × TERMit  0.274 
(0.620) 
  2.208* 
(1.175) 
 -2.019 
(1.654) 
  -4.948 
(3.684) 
LVit-1 × CREDITit   -0.240 
(0.554) 
 0.552 
(1.353) 
  -6.502*** 
(1.721) 
 -10.94*** 
(4.008) 
LVit-1 × TEDit    5.629*** 
(2.054) 
4.771* 
(2.638) 
   6.355 
(8.690) 
21.016** 
(10.254) 
Wald test 397.0*** 367.1*** 454.8*** 497.8*** 819.1*** 123.5*** 114.0*** 105.7*** 118.4*** 225.6*** 
z2 -0.86 -0.39 -0.89 -1.63 -1.51 0.19 -1.13 0.33 -0.25 -1.44 
Sargan test 517.16 522.33 514.40 410.37 513.62 181.22 179.85 180.98 175.30 163.50 
Observations 4448 4448 4448 4448 4448 870 870 870 870 870 
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Groups 547 547 547 547 547 193 193 193 193 193 
 
The table reports the results of estimating equation (5) with the General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
panel data estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Variations in sample size are due to potential data 
limitations. LVLTA is the ratio of total (nonequity) liabilities to total assets, and LVDC is the ratio of total debt 
to capital, where capital is defined as total debt plus equity. For the market values of leverage the book value of 
equity is replaced by the market value of equity. The determinants of the adjustment speed are as follows: 
ISHORT is the 3-month money market interest rate, TERM is the difference between the yield of government 
bonds with a maturity of at least 10 years and ISHORT, CREDIT is the difference between the yields of AAA 
rated corporate bonds and government bonds, TED is the difference between the 3-month Eurodollar rate for 
U.S. Dollars and the 90-day yield on U.S. Treasury bills. An observation is classified as financially constraint if 
the Tobin’s Q is greater than 1 and the current ratio is below 2. The table shows the coefficients on the lagged 
leverage ratio and on the interaction term of the determinant of adjustment speed with the lagged leverage ratio. 
Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1%/5%/10% level are marked with ***/**/*. Robust stan-
dard errors are in brackets. The Wald test statistic refers to the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the deter-
minants of target debt ratio are jointly equal to zero. The test statistic z2 tests the null hypothesis of no second 
order correlation in the residuals. The Sargan test statistics refers to the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid and uses the Arellano and Bond (1991) two-step estimator. 
